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Abstract. Insurance can be an important mechanism to stim-
ulate flood risk reduction and thus decrease losses. However,
there is a gap between the theoretical potential described by
academic scholars and the actual engagement of insurers.
In the analysis, I have collected examples of insurers’ en-
gagement in flood risk reduction, focusing on household and
business insurance in developed countries. Insurers engaged
either directly, e.g., through co-financing risk reduction, or
more indirectly by giving incentives to policyholders or gov-
ernmental actors to adopt risk reduction measures. I analyzed
their engagement with the framing conditions of the market
they were acting in, such as market penetration or private or
public insurance schemes. I found risk reduction measures
like awareness-raising campaigns targeting citizens to be
quite common across several countries. There was less insur-
ance engagement in risk reduction measures such as warning
or land-use planning, which are perceived to be mainly gov-
ernmental tasks. The use of risk-based pricing as an incentive
for the adoption of risk reduction measures as suggested by
academia is difficult in practice, due to barriers such as infor-
mation gaps on the effectiveness of property-level protection
measures and requirements concerning the affordability of
insurance. New approaches to overcome these shortfalls in-
clude organized data collection on property-level protection
measures or the insurance of high-risks for affordable pre-
miums in public–private partnership constellations with the
government.
1 Introduction
Economic losses of weather-related hazards are already high
and expected to increase in the future (CEA, 2009; Jongman
et al., 2014; Paudel et al., 2015; Swiss Re, 2012). Mainly
socioeconomic developments, but also climate change, can
largely be held accountable for rising loss trends, with valu-
able assets increasingly exposed to flood risks (Alfieri et
al., 2016; Botzen et al., 2010; Hoeppe, 2016; Kundzewicz
et al., 2014; Morita, 2014). The negative impacts of rising
flood losses challenge governments, the public sector, and
the private sector to develop sustainable flood risk manage-
ment mechanisms aimed at reducing those losses (Michel-
Kerjan and Kunreuther, 2011; Mills, 2005). Acknowledging
the slow progress and limited success of climate change mit-
igation in reducing greenhouse gases, sustainable adaptation
is seen as one necessary management strategy to reduce and
manage the risks of climate change (Eisenack et al., 2014;
IPCC, 2014). Adaptation is defined as adjustment to actual or
future implications of climate change aiming to avoid harm
or to exploit benefits (IPCC, 2014). It should be noted that in
natural hazard research, the terms “adaptation” and “mitiga-
tion” are often used synonymously in the sense of reducing
impacts or losses (see, e.g., Bouwer et al., 2014). In this pa-
per, only the term adaptation is used.
Flood risk is generally determined by the hazard itself, the
population, assets and values at risk from being flooded (ex-
posure), and the vulnerability of society, i.e., their capacity
or ability to cope with flood events (Kron, 2005). Thus, flood
risk reduction measures can be classified according to which
of the flood risk determinants they influence (Fig. 1b). An-
other important aspect is that different flood reduction mea-
sures address floods of different strength and return periods
(Fig. 1a); while emergency management and adaptation mea-
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Figure 1. Flood risk reduction measures sorted by their potential to reduce losses due to the strength of the flood event (a) and sorted
according to their risk reduction mechanism (b).
sures are best suited to avoid or reduce losses from minor
flood events with a high return period, successful land-use
planning has the potential to avoid not only losses from mi-
nor events, but also from more seldom extreme events. Risk
knowledge and warning are considered to be preconditions
which facilitate or enable the implementation of the other
risk reduction measures. Insurance has a special role in this
context, as it is not primarily meant to avoid or reduce losses,
but to compensate for losses after seldom severe events and
thus facilitate recovery. Flood risk management today relies
on a mix of structural and nonstructural measures (Fuchs et
al., 2017; Kreibich et al., 2015; Krysanova et al., 2008; Kubal
et al., 2009).
Flood risk management is often framed as a cyclical pro-
cess (see Fig. 2, lower right circle), starting with a flood event
(Thieken et al., 2016). As a direct response to the flood event,
i.e., already during the flooding, emergency measures can be
taken to limit negative impacts, e.g., the destruction of valu-
able items. In the recovery stage, i.e., when the flood is over,
damage is repaired, and affected societies will try to return
to “normal life” or pre-flood conditions. In the “risk assess-
ment” phase, the flood risk is assessed in a systematic way
to inform planning of risk reduction measures in the “risk re-
duction” phase. In reality, these phases are often linked with
each other; i.e., risk reduction measures can be implemented
while damage is repaired (Moatty, 2017).
Actors involved in flood risk reduction span from state
and local government to municipalities, private households,
and businesses and insurers. Governmental actors decide on
a country’s insurance scheme, regulate the market, set and
enforce building standards that allow properties to with-
stand flooding, develop land-use plans, implement large-
scale flood protection measures, and provide warning and
emergency services. Households and private business can
contribute to flood risk reduction by preventing losses from
minor high-frequency flood events on their own property and
by purchasing insurance to cover larger losses. The primary
task of insurance is risk transfer, i.e., the spreading of losses
in time and space, shared with third parties in exchange for a
premium (Bouwer et al., 2014; Duus-Otterström and Jagers,
2011; Warner et al., 2009). If working as it is supposed to, in-
surance gives affected people fast access to capital for recon-
struction, enabling fast recovery in the aftermath of a disaster.
Without insurance it would simply be too risky to undertake
many activities (Ranger et al., 2011).
Beyond this core function of insurance, there is grow-
ing recognition of the large potential that insurance has in
providing incentives for other risk reduction measures and
to prevent damage (Botzen et al., 2010; Box et al., 2016;
Bräuninger et al., 2011; Herweijer et al., 2009; Kunreuther,
1996; Surminski and Eldridge, 2015). This aspect has also re-
ceived attention among policymakers: in its Green Paper on
the insurance of natural and man-made disasters (EC, 2013),
the European Union asks how risk transfer mechanisms can
better fulfill their prevention role (Surminski, 2014). The
reinsurance industry also appeals to the concept of combin-
ing flood insurance and prevention (Swiss Re, 2012). Instead
of being common practice, the link between insurance and
flood risk reduction, to date, appears to be more theoretical
in nature; i.e., insurance engagement in flood risk reduction
seems to be quite limited (Den et al., 2017; Smolka, 2006;
Surminski and Hudson, 2017). In addition, insurance can
also lead to a moral hazard, i.e., having a detrimental effect
by creating disincentives for flood risk reduction (O’Hare et
al., 2015).
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Table 1. Overview of insurance schemes and flood insurance conditions for household and business insurance in several countries, depicting
the range from public to private insurance schemes. (Information in this table was derived from Atreya et al., 2015; Den et al., 2017; Guillier,
2017; Hanger et al., 2018; Kousky, 2017; Kousky et al., 2016; Priest et al., 2016; Surminski and Eldridge, 2015; Surminski and Thieken,
2017.)
Country Insurance scheme
public–private
Bundled or single
hazard
Flat or risk-based
premium
Compulsory, quasi-
compulsory, or
voluntary
Market penetration
Switzerland Public monopoly
insurer in 19 cantons,
private insurance in
7 cantons
Bundled multiple
hazards
Flat premiums Quasi-compulsory (tied
with fire insurance)
High (99 % of all buildings)
Spain Public, but customer
relationship managed
by private insurance
companies
Bundled multiple
hazard
Flat premiums Compulsory 75 %–100 % (for households
and business)
USA Public, but customer
relationship managed
by private insurance
companies
Single hazard Risk-based premi-
ums are applied for
80 % of all policies
Quasi-compulsory in
the 100-year floodplain
(requirement for mort-
gages from regulated or
state backed lenders),
otherwise voluntary
Large variations between the
states, maximum 35 % in
Florida
France Public–private: private
primary insurers, public
and private reinsurance
Bundled multiple
hazards
Flat premiums of
12 % surcharge on
property insur.
Quasi-compulsory (tied
with property
insurance)
High (100 % for households,
90 % for business)
Denmark Public (flooding from
rivers and seas due
to storms occurring
1/20 years); private for
minor events
Bundled Limited risk differ-
entiation
Public: quasi-
compulsory (tied with
fire insurance)
Private: voluntary
50 %–75 % for households
Austria Private insurance with
limited coverage co-
existing with a gov-
ernmental post-disaster
catastrophe fund
Bundled No risk-based
premiums
Voluntary Low (10 %–25 %); insurance is
often denied in high-risk areas
Sweden Private Bundled with
property insurance
Limited risk differ-
entiation
Quasi-compulsory (re-
quirement for
mortgages)
High (> 75 % for business,
> 95 % for households)
UK
(post-2016)
Private Bundled with
building and
content insurance
Risk-based pricing,
though little varia-
tion in premiums
Quasi-compulsory
(requirement for
mortgages)
High (75 %–98 % for house-
holds)
Germany Private Single hazard
and bundled
insurance available
Risk-based Voluntary Low (40 % for building
insurance)
Flood insurance schemes in developed countries vary con-
siderably (see Table 1) with respect to who provides insur-
ance, the degree of government involvement and coopera-
tion with insurers, legal requirements, the availability and de-
mand for insurance, whether insurance is compulsory or vol-
untary, the design of insurance products, and the insurance
market penetration (Atreya et al., 2015; Bouwer et al., 2007;
Den et al., 2017; Johannsdottir, 2017; Lamond and Penning-
Rowsell, 2014; Porrini and Schwarze, 2014; Surminski et al.,
2015; Suykens et al., 2016). These framing conditions for
insurance businesses are due not only to a country’s over-
all flood risk (Feyen et al., 2012), but also historic develop-
ments of insurance schemes and national societal preferences
of how disaster losses should be shared. As there is no “one
size fits all” approach for flood insurance, it can be expected
that the different framing conditions influence insurers’ en-
gagement in flood risk reduction and the incentives they use
to foster the uptake of flood risk reduction measures by other
actors, i.e., governments, private persons, and businesses.
There is a small but steadily growing body of litera-
ture that examines certain aspects of this issue. Present
studies have focused on which economic instruments can
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be used to incentivize prevention (Bräuninger et al., 2011;
Filatova, 2014), how the insurance system should be de-
signed to support more adaptation (Kunreuther, 1996; La-
mond and Penning-Rowsell, 2014; Michel-Kerjan and Kun-
reuther, 2011), how prevention is or could be considered
in the recovery process (Priest et al., 2016; Suykens et al.,
2016), the distribution of responsibilities between insurers
and the government (Keskitalo et al., 2014), how policy and
market factors hamper or support insurers’ engagement in
flood risk adaptation (Glaas et al., 2016; Surminski et al.,
2015), and recently also how insurers are engaged in flood
risk reduction in certain countries (Den et al., 2017; Poussin
et al., 2013; Surminski, 2014; Surminski and Hudson, 2017;
Surminski and Thieken, 2017). Nevertheless, it still remains
unclear to what extent insurance can be used to boost flood
risk reduction (Surminski, 2014), for what types of flood risk
reduction measures can be used, and what the incentivizing
mechanisms insurers currently use or could use are (Atreya
et al., 2015).
This article tries to shed light on this by investigating the
current engagement of insurers in developed countries in dif-
ferent flood risk reduction measures and their use of incen-
tives to get other actors engaged. I analyze how these activ-
ities are influenced by framing conditions such as the insur-
ance scheme or market penetration (see assessment frame-
work depicted in Fig. 2). The study focuses on developed
countries and on household and business flood insurance.
Detailed legal requirements for insurers in each country were
not considered as this was beyond the scope of this study. The
analysis is not limited to selected countries, but there is cer-
tainly a bias in the number of publications about insurance
systems in different countries, and access to national publi-
cations was limited by language skills of the author.
2 Context – how does flood insurance work?
Insurance is based on the principle of solidarity; i.e., individ-
ual persons get together to form a risk-bearing community in
the case of losses to cover the loss of its individual members.
This function is currently organized and coordinated by in-
surance companies, which offer insurance to individuals in
exchange for a premium. The collected premiums are then
used to compensate individual losses. Insurers are organized
in different legal forms; some are nonprofit state-owned com-
panies and others are private entities owned by their policy-
holders (cooperative/mutual insurance), while others are pri-
vate profit-oriented companies.
In principle, risks are considered insurable when the fol-
lowing conditions are fulfilled: there is a large enough num-
ber of exposed people that perceive they might suffer a
considerable loss that they cannot cope with alone. Subse-
quently, if they wish to share this risk with a third party, there
is a demand for insurance. The loss itself must happen ran-
domly and must be evident; i.e., it must be possible to de-
marcate it in that it happens at a certain time interval, at a
defined place, and from a known cause. In order to offer in-
surance, insurers must be able to calculate expected losses by
knowing their probability of occurrence as well as the costs
attached to recovery. Historic claim data in combination with
risk modeling are often used to assess this. Many risks occur
with different frequencies and intensities, and therefore in-
surance companies must be sure that there is only limited risk
that catastrophically large losses will occur. Furthermore,
insurers must be able to offer a product at an affordable pre-
mium so that demand can be met. At the same time, economic
feasibility must be known; i.e., the sum of premiums should
at least be high enough to cover the expenses of the insurer
(loss compensation plus administrative costs) or in the case
of private insurance companies, to also generate a profit.
These criteria must not be seen as absolute: catastrophi-
cally large losses are at least partly transferrable to reinsur-
ance companies and financial markets, and sometimes gov-
ernments take on the role as insurer of last resort, for exam-
ple, the Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros in Spain.
Demand can be sufficiently created by bundling one type of
risk with another (e.g., fire insurance is bundled with flood
insurance in Belgium) or by making insurance compulsory
for everyone (e.g., in France). Affordability for low-income
groups can be accomplished by state subsidies; for example,
in the USA, low-income households can receive premium
discounts, although this practice has now been phased out
(Kousky and Kunreuther, 2013).
Insuring against floods is a challenging issue (Swiss
Re, 2012). First, it is technically difficult to assess expo-
sure, probability of occurrence, and potential losses. Cli-
mate change complicates this further as it is still largely un-
known how climate change will impact flood risk in detail
(Kundzewicz et al., 2014). Second, the risk-bearing commu-
nity is often small: only people who perceive themselves to
be at risk from flooding demand insurance. Another problem
is adverse selection (Swiss Re, 2012); there is an information
asymmetry between the policyholders and insurers, resulting
in more people who are at high risk from flooding seeking
insurance, while insurers charge too low a premium for this
risk. To build up financial resources sufficient to cover po-
tential damage would require high premiums, which in turn
counteract the affordability criterion.
It is not surprising from a mathematical point of view
that certain areas or properties are considered uninsurable.
This is often where the government steps in with different
forms of intervention. The degree of government intervention
ranges from taxpayer-financed flood loss compensation in
the Netherlands, monopoly insurance systems as in parts of
Switzerland1 and Spain, and compulsory all-natural-hazards
1For Switzerland, it should be noted that most articles charac-
terize the Swiss system as a monopoly insurance system (see, e.g.,
Bräuninger et al., 2011; Porrini and Schwarze, 2014). In fact, this
is only true for 19 of the 26 cantons. In the remaining cantons,
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or bundled insurance (e.g., France), to single-hazard mixed
government-private sector systems (USA) and private insur-
ance markets with only limited or ad hoc compensation by
the government (e.g., Germany, UK). Flood insurance can
also be quasi-compulsory, meaning that the insurance itself is
voluntary, but for example, needed for taking out a property
mortgage (Smolka, 2006). To explore this, several scholars
have carried out comparative reviews of insurance systems
in different countries (Atreya et al., 2015; Bräuninger et al.,
2011; Den et al., 2017; Keskitalo et al., 2014; Lamond and
Penning-Rowsell, 2014; Paudel, 2012; Porrini and Schwarze,
2014; Suykens et al., 2016).
Government intervention can have advantages and disad-
vantages. When losses are compensated by the taxpayer or by
ad hoc post-disaster government assistance (as in Germany
after severe flood events in 2002 and 2013) (Thieken et al.,
2016), or people feel safe behind large structural protection
measures, this can lead to a problem called a charity hazard:
people at risk see less necessity to purchase insurance or un-
dertake prevention measures as they presume their losses are
already covered (Hudson et al., 2017). Similarly, a moral haz-
ard will occur when obtained insurance coverage decreases
peoples motivation to take risk reduction measures (Hudson
et al., 2017). A moral hazard can also occur at the govern-
ment level, where high insurance market penetration or the
availability of emergency funds (as from the European Soli-
darity Fund) might lower the urgency for the government to
implement prevention measures (Surminski, 2014; Surmin-
ski et al., 2015).
Differences also exist in the design of flood insurance
products. Coverage exists for damage to buildings, their con-
tents, and cars, as well as for business interruption, loss of
agricultural harvest, or damage to infrastructure. While the
household and small business sector can be considered to be
mass markets for flood insurance, for high-value objects such
as large companies, contract conditions are often negotiated
separately. A further distinction is made between different
types of flood, which is necessary to demarcate the event.
Examples include riverine flood, coastal flood, storm surge,
flash flood, torrential rainfall, dam burst, ice jam, mudflow,
lahar, groundwater flooding, or tsunami (Swiss Re, 2012).
There is insurance that covers only one type of flood or sev-
eral types of flood, or that bundles the flood risk together
with other natural hazards, such as the French all-hazards
insurance (Bräuninger et al., 2011). The insurance contract
specifies the length of the contract, premium and deductibles,
indemnity limits, coverage, and exclusions (e.g., of certain
types of events or certain assets), as well as special conditions
(Surminski and Eldridge, 2015). These special conditions
can require the implementation of preventive measures. In
combination with the premium, deductibles and coverage ad-
where natural hazard insurance is not provided by cantonal insur-
ance monopolies, private companies compete in a free-market sys-
tem (Paudel, 2012).
justments are considered important incentives to trigger more
preventive behavior (Kunreuther, 1996). The disadvantage of
having many contracts with different contract conditions is
that the insurer is required to monitor whether the conditions
are fulfilled, which raises their transaction costs (Botzen and
Van Den Bergh, 2008; Thieken et al., 2006). Nowadays, 1-
year insurance contracts are most common (Bräuninger et
al., 2011). This is often seen as a barrier for risk preven-
tion, as most risk reduction measures only pay off in the long
run – both for insurance companies as well as policyholders
(Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther, 2011). On the other hand,
multi-year contracts will be more expensive as they need to
consider future uncertainties (Maynard and Ranger, 2012)
and thus can be expected to decrease insurance demand. In
addition, 1-year contracts give the insurers the flexibility to
adapt their business to changing conditions such as changes
in flood risk due to climate change.
3 Analytical framework and research approach
To understand insurers’ engagement or lack of engagement
in flood risk reduction, it is important to consider three as-
pects: first, what types of flood risk reduction measures exist
and how they contribute to flood risk reduction, second, what
incentives insurers have to promote those risk reduction mea-
sures, and third, what the framing conditions are (i.e., insur-
ance scheme, market penetration) which hinder or stimulate
insurers to get engaged in flood risk reduction. For the analy-
sis, conceptualization of the flood risk management cycle as
used by Surminski and Thieken (2017) was adapted as shown
in Fig. 2 (lower right circle). Changes to the original frame-
work are marked in cursive letters. Under the bullet point
“prevention”, “building codes” were added as another strat-
egy to enforce resilience on a larger spatial scale. The term
mitigation was replaced by adaptation to be consistent with
the working of the paper. The term “awareness campaigns”
was removed from the category “preparedness for response”
and added to the risk assessment phase in the category “risk
knowledge”, as I consider increasing citizens’ risk knowl-
edge to be the main purpose of awareness campaigns. With-
out acquiring knowledge of their flood risk, i.e., assessment
of their own risk, citizens will not take flood risk reduction
measures in the risk reduction phase.
The flood risk management framework was further ex-
panded by postulating that insurers’ engagement in flood
risk reduction has interdependencies with framing condi-
tions. These conditions include the insurance scheme insur-
ers are operating in, the distribution of responsibilities for
flood risk management in society, the market penetration of
flood insurance, and the flood risk situation in a country. In
addition, there are also interdependencies with the types of
incentives insurers can use to promote flood risk reduction.
To analyze what mechanisms insurers use to incentivize
flood risk reduction measures and to evaluate the influence
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Figure 2. Assessment framework for interdependencies between insurance schemes, flood risk reduction measures, and insurers’ incentives
for flood risk reduction; the flood risk management cycle (lower right corner) was adapted from Surminski and Thieken (2017).
of framing conditions, relevant peer-reviewed scientific liter-
ature was examined, found in the research database Web of
Science using a combination of the search terms “insurance”,
“flood”, and “risk reduction” (46 hits, oldest from 2010) and
“insurance”, “flood”, and “prevention” (38 hits, oldest from
2000), which were present either in the title, keywords, or
the abstract of the publication. The results of both searches
were combined and doubles were removed. After that, all ab-
stracts were screened, and publications not considered as rel-
evant as they focused on developing countries or dealt with
different issues such as behavioral studies on risk reduction
or loss modeling, were removed. A total of 31 core publi-
cations remained, which were considered as highly relevant.
Additional relevant publications were identified based on the
reference lists of these core publications. In addition to aca-
demic literature, Google was used to assess what kind of
flood risk reduction measures are currently used by insur-
ers in developed countries. A search was done for websites
containing information on insurance and the different flood
reduction measures as listed in the assessment framework in
Fig. 2. The search was performed in English, German, and
Norwegian languages. This work is explorative in nature and
the author is aware of the potential bias due to her limitations
in language skills.
4 Results
4.1 Insurance engagement in flood risk reduction
4.1.1 Risk knowledge
Even though collecting data and increasing knowledge about
flood risk as such do not reduce the flood risk itself, they can
be considered as important preconditions for a better under-
standing of the risk and successful implementation of risk
reduction measures. Different forms and various channels of
communication are used to raise awareness and increase un-
derstanding around issues of climate change, flooding, flood
risk, adaptation measures, and insurance, and how they are
all linked (Bouwer et al., 2014). Communication and edu-
cation measures targeting citizens include mass media cam-
paigns in newspapers, radio, TV, and internet, but also com-
pulsory information disclosure for rented or sold properties,
as well as education programs. These aim to educate citizens
about flood risk in general and available market insurance
policies, but also to promote decentralized property-level
adaptation measures. Insurers have a vital interest in rais-
ing public awareness about flood risks, as these campaigns
can help to inform people about their personal flood risk and
make them aware of the benefits of insurance and risk reduc-
tion (Den et al., 2017). Such campaigns can be considered
as part of the interaction between insurers and their actual or
future potential policyholders. Thus, they have the potential
to increase market penetration to avoid negative selection.
In Germany, information campaigns for natural hazard in-
surance were run by several federal states with support from
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the German Insurance Association (GDV). They were quite
successful in raising the insurance penetration to on average
40 % (GDV, 2017) and have managed to double the number
of policies within the last 15 years2. In France, awareness-
raising campaigns are eligible for funding from the Barnier
Fund3, which is financed by insurance premiums. In Switzer-
land, private insurers combine public hazard maps with infor-
mation on how to protect private property from natural haz-
ards4. Also in Italy increased insurance activities for offering
advice on property-level adaptation measures were noticed
(Botzen et al., 2017). Outreach and marketing campaigns are
also run by the NFIP in the USA (Kousky, 2017). A sur-
vey among private insurance companies in the USA showed
that nearly half of all interviewed property and casualty in-
surers mailed leaflets or provided information on their web-
site on how to reduce losses from weather-related disasters
(Leurig and Dlugolecki, 2013). In Norway, in a coopera-
tion of academia and Finance Norway, an umbrella organi-
zation for the financial industry including insurers, an educa-
tion tool for schools5 was developed to introduce knowledge
about climate change, extreme weather events, and preven-
tion (Finans Norge, 2012). In the USA, information-based
activities rank highest for implementation by municipalities
among the risk reduction measures, which are awarded by
credit points in the NFIP community ranking system (Sadiq
and Noonan, 2015).
In a workshop on how to improve the linkages between
insurance and flood risk reduction, lack of access to de-
tailed information was mentioned as a barrier (Surminski et
al., 2015). Indeed, information sharing between insurers and
governmental actors, in particular, municipalities, was sug-
gested in several studies (Den et al., 2017; NOU, 2015). Ap-
parent benefits for both governmental actors as well as insur-
ers are that they can improve their knowledge base on flood
risk and flood risk reduction by integrating new data sets.
For example, in Germany, in cooperation with authorities, the
insurance industry integrated the official flood hazard zones
into their flood zoning system (ZÜRS), which resulted in a
more accurate risk classification and more households being
considered insurable against flooding (Kron, 2013; Surmin-
ski and Thieken, 2017). Another example for information
sharing and public–private cooperation with insurance in-
volvement is the HORA online platform6 developed in Aus-
tria, which provides risk zoning for natural hazards, includ-
ing floods, and aims to inform citizens (Stiefelmeyer and
2http://www.gdv.de/2017/04/mehr-hausbesitzer-versichern-
sich-gegen-ueberschwemmungen/, last access: 12 September 2018
3https://www.ccr.fr/en/fonds-publics, last access: 12 Septem-
ber 2018
4https://www.zurich.ch/de/services/naturgefahren/start, last ac-
cess: 12 September 2018
5https://www.miljolare.no/en/aktiviteter/klima/ekstremver/, last
access: 12 September 2018
6http://www.hora.gv.at/, last access: 12 September 2018
Hlatky, 2008). Similarly, the Association of British Insur-
ers in the UK cooperated with public agencies to improve
the quality of flood maps in the UK (Surminski, 2014). In
Switzerland, a large private insurance company combined
public natural hazard maps with national economic data and
their insurance data to create better risk maps, and made the
data publicly accessible7. In the USA, flood insurance rate
maps developed under the NFIP are regarded as an important
risk communication tool (Kousky, 2017). In fact, the whole
organization of the insurance system in the USA is based on
these maps, as the flood zones determine who is required to
purchase flood insurance. These maps are evaluated regularly
and local governments can get engaged in the mapping pro-
cess and contribute better data (Kousky, 2017). In Denmark
the combination of insurance and municipal data led to bet-
ter reinsurance conditions for the insurers as they could prove
that municipal efforts have reduced the flood risk (Den et al.,
2017). On the other hand, municipalities can also learn more
about their exposure by looking at historic insurance claim
data, as they did in a pilot project in Norway8. Information
transfer from insurers to municipalities might be more prob-
lematic compared to the other way around. Claim data are
spatially explicit; i.e., data privacy issues must be consid-
ered. And in private insurance systems, historic claim data
have a competitive value and therefore insurers are often re-
luctant in sharing the data (Botzen et al., 2010). In France,
where flood insurance is compulsory and provided by pri-
vate companies backed up with a state guarantee (Porrini
and Schwarze, 2014), part of the insurance revenues from
natural hazard insurance are transferred to the Major Natural
Risk Prevention Fund, also known as the Barnier Fund9. This
fund finances actions that decrease the exposure of insurers
(Poussin et al., 2013; Suykens et al., 2016). In the context of
communication, it finances studies necessary to prepare the
obligatory natural disaster prevention plans in municipalities.
An interesting new approach to combine information
transfer about property-level risk reduction measures to cit-
izens with property-level data collection was found in Ger-
many. Here the insurance industry was involved in the devel-
opment of a building certificate (“Hochwasserpass”), which
has been available since 2014 and proofs the standard of
flood protection for single properties10. After a first rough
flood risk assessment combined with general information
about flood risk and flood risk reduction options, which is
available on the internet for free, the property owner pays
for the second step, which includes a more detailed assess-
7https://www.mobiliar.ch/die-mobiliar/engagement/
praevention/mobigis, last access: 12 September 2018
8https://www.finansnorge.no/globalassets/presentasjoner/2017/
nordress-island.pdf, last access: 12 September 2018
9https://www.ccr.fr/en/fonds-publics, last access: 12 Septem-
ber 2018
10https://www.hochwasser-pass.com/, last access: 12 Septem-
ber 2018
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ment and results in a flood risk certificate. This second step
includes plausibility checking of the local conditions and an
on-site visit by a qualified expert if necessary (DKKV, 2015),
who suggests how to make the property more flood-resistant
(Surminski and Thieken, 2017). The idea behind the certifi-
cate is that it can be used by property owners in negotiations
with insurers for better insurance conditions or with banks
for mortgages.
A new knowledge sharing initiative, which was launched
in 2017 in the UK, is going in a similar direction, whereby
certified surveyors will provide information on building pro-
tection measures to property owners, as well as collect data
about the effectiveness of these protection measures after an
event and enter it into a database shared by several insurance
companies11. In the future such a database could deliver the
information needed to assess the flood risk of single proper-
ties, which is a precondition for better risk-based pricing (see
also Sect. 4.2.1).
There are also communication fora initiated by insurers or
reinsurers meant to provide a discussion platform for differ-
ent stakeholders to exchange opinions about climate change
adaptation, including floods. Examples are the Munich Cli-
mate Insurance Initiative (MCII)12 in Germany and Climate-
Wise in the UK13, or international fora like the Extreme
Events and Climate Risk forum hosted by the Geneva As-
sociation14 or the UNEP Finance Initiative15.
4.1.2 Prevention
Planning, including building codes and land-use planning, is
considered an important factor in flood risk management as
well as in climate change adaptation (Botzen and Van Den
Bergh, 2008; Hurlimann and March, 2012; Measham et al.,
2011; Petrow et al., 2006). Land-use planning is an integral
part of flood risk management, as it prevents future detrimen-
tal developments that increase flood losses by, for example,
avoiding new settlements in flood-prone areas or restricting
the use of those areas (Botzen and Van Den Bergh, 2008)
or by preserving wetlands, which can contribute to reduced
flood losses (Brody et al., 2015; Calil et al., 2015). Land-use
planning takes place at national, regional and local levels,
and across levels (Bouwer et al., 2014; Petrow et al., 2006).
Another strategy is the enforcement of building codes, which
can reduce the vulnerability of buildings to flooding and thus
also damage. There are building codes that are valid for all
11https://www.bre.co.uk/news/BRE-Global-to-launch-a-new-
certification-scheme-for-property-flood-resilience-surveyors-
1217.html, last access: 12 September 2018
12http://www.climate-insurance.org/home/, last access:
12 September 2018
13http://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/business-action/
sustainable-finance/climatewise, last access: 12 September 2018
14https://www.genevaassociation.org/research/topics/
climate-risk/, last access: 12 September 2018
15http://www.unepfi.org/, last access: 12 September 2018
properties, but in flood-prone areas, building codes are often
more strict (Aerts and Botzen, 2011). One important aspect
to be considered is that building codes only apply to new
buildings, i.e., not to the existing building stock.
The decree and enforcement of building codes and land-
use planning procedures are governmental tasks. Due to their
importance for flood loss reduction, it is not surprising that
in countries where the state provides flood insurance, insur-
ers exert influence on land-use planning and formulation of
building codes. In the USA, the NFIP, i.e., the insurer itself,
sets minimum requirements for participating municipalities
concerning their flood zoning and their building codes. They
require elevation of all new buildings or when heavily dam-
aged buildings are reconstructed, to build above water levels
of the 100-year flood line (Aerts and Botzen, 2011; Kousky,
2017; Petrow et al., 2006). Communities can voluntarily leg-
islate stricter building codes than required by the NFIP. In
New York additional requirements for elevation and wet and
dry flood-proofing of buildings exist, which are distinguished
according to whether a building lies in a coastal or an inland
risk zone (Aerts and Botzen, 2011). While NFIP was eval-
uated positively for limiting the vulnerability of new build-
ings, it was criticized for its poor land-use management, i.e.,
giving incentives to settle in hazard areas instead of limiting
new developments in flood zones (Aerts and Botzen, 2011;
Johnston, 2012; Pompe and Rinehart, 2008). In Switzerland,
insurers are also involved in the process of enforcing build-
ing codes. In areas with a determined risk they will, for ex-
ample, check the building plans and requirements for hazard-
adapted building construction (Camenzind and Loat, 2014).
Swiss insurers can also significantly influence land-use plan-
ning processes: denying coverage in certain areas will lead to
an adjustment of land-use plans (Petrow et al., 2006). Simi-
larly, in the UK, properties built after 2009 in areas of high
flood risk can be excluded from insurance. But even though
this is meant to create a disincentive for further valuable de-
velopments in high-risk areas, new houses are still being built
in floodplains (Surminski and Thieken, 2017). In Germany’s
private insurance system, insurers get engaged in the formu-
lation of building codes at a higher level to a limited extent.
The GDV, as representative of its members, comments, e.g.,
on new building codes or changes in building norms (GDV,
personal communication, 2014).
4.1.3 Adaptation by property-level measures
While large-scale structural protection measures aim to re-
duce the probability of flood occurrence or its strength (i.e.,
the hazard), decentralized property-level risk reduction or
protection measures can also reduce the negative conse-
quences of flooding (i.e., exposure and vulnerability). There
are a broad variety of structural and nonstructural measures:
structural single-property building measures as elevation or
dry- and wet-proofing of houses, or nonstructural strategies,
such as removing all valuable items from the basement of
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a property. Several studies demonstrated the effectiveness
of these kinds of adaptation measures, especially for high-
probability flood events (Bubeck et al., 2012; Hudson et al.,
2014; Kreibich et al., 2005, 2011; de Moel et al., 2014;
Poussin et al., 2015), but also showed that the effectiveness of
each protection measure very much depended on the type of
measures chosen and local circumstances, such as the char-
acteristics of the flood (Hudson et al., 2014; Poussin et al.,
2015). It is easy to imagine that mobile water barriers on
doors and windows will have no effect once they are sur-
passed, whereas securing oil tanks against buoyancy will be
effective, independent of flood water depth (Kreibich et al.,
2011). Structural property-level protection measures can be
addressed in building codes, while this is not the case for
nonstructural measures.
Insurers have different options to get engaged in adap-
tation activities. In the USA, NFIP can require flood-proof
construction in new building areas or improved reconstruc-
tion of destroyed properties. Within the 100-year flood zone,
buildings have to be elevated above the water depth expected
for a 100-year flood (Aerts and Botzen, 2011; Kousky, 2017;
Petrow et al., 2006). In Germany, with a private insurance
system, there is no statutory obligation to install property-
level protection measures (Surminski and Thieken, 2017),
but surveys with insurance companies revealed that more and
more insurers require property-level protection measures in
high-risk zones as a condition for offering insurance (DKKV,
2015). And even though German insurers in general only pay
for reconstruction to the same conditions as before, more and
more insurance companies also allow for flood-adapted re-
construction or reinforcement of buildings after severe de-
struction, when this does not cause higher costs than a stan-
dard reconstruction following the applicable building codes
(GDV, personal communication, 2014). A similar rule ap-
plies in Germany for relocation; i.e., insurers only refund
costs for reconstruction at the same place and additional costs
due to relocation are not covered, but if covered from an-
other source they allow for relocation to a safer area (DKKV,
2015). In Denmark and Iceland, insurers can require the im-
plementation of property-level protection measures or other-
wise restrict coverage (Den et al., 2017; Priest et al., 2016).
Insurers can also positively acknowledge and thus foster im-
plementation of property-level risk reduction by designing
their products in a way that risk-reducing behavior is re-
warded in the form of reduced premiums or deductibles (for
more details on this issue, see Sect. 4.2.1). However, a main
barrier for policyholders to implement property-level protec-
tion measures is certainly the large upfront investment re-
quired (Aerts and Botzen, 2011; Bräuninger et al., 2011;
Kunreuther, 1996). Such an investment must be done all at
once, while benefits in the form of lowered premiums or
deductibles will accrue over a long period of time. A sug-
gestion to overcome this dilemma is that insurers cooperate
with banks or the state provides inexpensive loans or grants
to cover the large upfront investment (Botzen and Van Den
Bergh, 2008; Kunreuther, 2006). When the monthly repay-
ment for the loan is less than the difference between the
insurance premium with and without property-level protec-
tion measures, there is a clear financial gain for the policy-
holder (Bräuninger et al., 2011; Kunreuther, 2015). In prac-
tice, only the NFIP in the USA offers grants to policyholders
to implement property-level protection measures on existing
buildings or to upgrade them to comply with current build-
ing codes in the case of severe damage (Kousky, 2017). In
the case of severe repetitive damage, the policyholder has to
implement protection measures to avoid an increase in pre-
miums of 150 % (Aerts and Botzen, 2011). Unfortunately,
the list of property-level protection measures that are eligible
for grants is currently very short. The measures only include
elevation of houses, flood-proofing, and relocation (Aerts and
Botzen, 2011; Kousky, 2017).
4.1.4 Protection by large-scale infrastructure
Large-scale structural flood infrastructures, such as dams,
dikes, embankments, reservoirs, and polders (controlled re-
tention basins), or slope stabilization measures, decrease the
risk of flood occurrence or the magnitude of the event and
have proven their effectiveness in flooding events (Thieken
et al., 2016). Common to all large-scale structural measures
is that safety is only provided when well maintained (i.e.,
they do not fail) and when design levels are not exceeded
(Thieken et al., 2016). Two main functionalities of such in-
frastructure should be distinguished: infrastructure that pro-
tects an area from being inundated, i.e., keeps the water out-
side (e.g., dams and dikes), and infrastructure which enables
extra room for water storage, such as reservoirs and polders.
The first type of infrastructure only avoids flooding in a cer-
tain area and can have adverse consequences downstream as
greater levels of water flow there. In addition, it leads to the
avoidance of flooding, often through a self-reinforcing cycle,
of protected areas, attracting further economic development
(i.e., the number and value of assets increases), which in turn
leads to the claim of even stronger flood defense (Filatova,
2014), or in the case of infrastructure failure or overtopping,
to very high losses. The second type of infrastructure reduces
water volume and is thus beneficial for all downstream areas.
This difference is important to consider when pondering up-
and downsides to large-scale structural infrastructure.
Usually it is the government who invests in large-scale
structural protection measures. To the best of the author’s
knowledge there are no insurers to date which completely fi-
nance large-scale structural measures. In Switzerland, where
a dual system of public and private natural hazard insur-
ance exists, the Swiss cantons’ monopoly insurers invest
on average 15 % of their premium incomes in prevention
(von Ungern-Sternberg, 2004). Private insurance companies
also co-found large-scale structural measures in municipali-
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ties16. Nevertheless, public investments in risk reduction are
much higher in districts with a district insurance monopoly
(Paudel, 2012) because under private insurance schemes,
there will always be the risk of policyholders shifting to an-
other insurance company.
In the USA, the NFIP offers incentives for communities to
implement large-scale structural protection measures. Com-
munities who have joined the NFIP can voluntarily partici-
pate in the community rating system, which offers premium
reductions for the implementation of a list of flood protec-
tion measures. This list also contains dams and levees as
large-scale structural protection measures (Sadiq and Noo-
nan, 2015). In the case that the levee owner, i.e., mostly mu-
nicipalities, can document that the levee satisfies the national
requirements and provides protection from the flood with a
100-year return period, the obligation for house owners to
take out insurance can be lifted.
In the UK, a completely private insurance market has ex-
isted since 1960, when insurers and the government agreed
that insurance should be provided to all households and small
businesses under the requirement that the government invests
in large-scale flood protection to enable a minimum standard
of flood protection of 1/75 (i.e., they are protected against
floods with a recurrence interval of 75 years). The agree-
ment has been revised several times over the years, and al-
though the new “Flood Re” insurance scheme still contains
this requirement, no mechanism has been defined to moni-
tor compliance (Surminski and Eldridge, 2015). As it cur-
rently exists, the agreement has been heavily criticized: after
public investments reducing the flood risk beyond the flood
requirement of 1/75 years, insurance premiums remained
mainly the same; i.e., the expected benefit in the form of
avoided losses was not transferred to society or policyhold-
ers, but resulted in additional profit for insurance companies
(Penning-Rowsell, 2015). Evidence on this issue is difficult
to provide as flood insurance is offered bundled with other
hazards, making it difficult to disentangle the flood propor-
tion of the premium. To overcome this situation, Penning-
Rowsell (2015) suggests that insurance companies should be
forced to reduce premiums in the case that significant risk
reductions occur.
4.1.5 Preparedness for response
Monitoring and early warning activities encompass meteo-
rological and hydrological observations, often in combina-
tion with forecasting models, which allow for predictions of
approaching hazards. In addition, successful early warning
systems require that citizens receive the warning, understand
it, and react by taking the appropriate emergency response
measures. Emergency responses measures involve removing
mobile items of value from the area at risk (such as cars),
16https://www.mobiliar.ch/die-mobiliar/engagement/
uebersichtskarte-engagements#?topic=34, last access: 12 Septem-
ber 2018
temporary small-scale adaptation measures such as flood-
gates or sandbags being put in place, and people in the area
at risk from flooding being evacuated.
Even though monitoring, early warning, and emergency
response right after or during a flood are governmental tasks,
some insurance companies provide a warning service for pol-
icyholders. For example, the Swiss cantons’ monopoly insur-
ers offer a mobile phone application that warns the user of
approaching natural hazards and at the same time provides
safety information on how to reduce losses17. The benefit for
insurers is that their policyholders then have the possibility
to safeguard movable items (e.g., cars, furniture) and thus
reduce losses. Insurers also become active as soon as possi-
ble after the damage has occurred. During damage appraisal,
their employees can often give valuable advice on how to
avoid a further increase in damage by properly starting the
recovery process. An example from insurance engagement
in emergency response activities also comes from Switzer-
land: the cantonal monopoly insurers finance the fire service
and cantonal civil defence services (Atreya et al., 2015).
4.2 Insurers’ incentives for flood risk reduction
4.2.1 Premiums, deductibles, and indemnification
limits
In academic literature, the most frequently mentioned mech-
anisms to stimulate policyholders to adopt risk-reducing be-
havior are premiums and deductibles – in the case they are re-
flecting the actual risk a policyholder is exposed to (Botzen
and Van Den Bergh, 2008; Kunreuther, 1996). In a perfect
market, with well-informed and rational-acting market par-
ticipants, insurers would earn enough premiums to cover all
losses and policyholders would implement flood risk reduc-
tion measures when it is economically reasonable for them.
A resulting reduction in flood risk would then mean that
the insurance requires less money to cover the losses, and
thus premiums and deductibles could decrease. The real-
ity, however, looks a bit different. Firstly, premiums’ cal-
culations often do not only follow actuarial principles, but
are restricted by legislation (Kousky and Shabman, 2014)
with the aim of avoiding excluding certain policyholders or
to avoid rapid price hikes. In France, where the solidarity
principle is very important, all citizens pay the same fixed
rate determined by the government, independent of the risk
they are exposed to (Suykens et al., 2016). Secondly, flood
risk is bundled with other risks so the premium does not re-
flect a single risk. Bundling floods with other natural hazards
(France, Portugal, Switzerland, and Iceland), fire (Belgium,
Denmark), or building/household insurance (USA, Spain) is
very common (Lamond and Penning-Rowsell, 2014; Macca-
ferri et al., 2012). Thirdly, premiums are cross-subsidized,
either within a peril, between low and high risks, or between
perils. For example, in the USA, policyholders in low risk ar-
17https://wetteralarm.ch, last access: 12 September 2018
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eas are charged a higher premium than the one which would
be adequate for their risk, and thus subsidize high-risk areas
where a risk-reflective premium is considered to be too high
to be affordable by policyholders (Kousky, 2017; Kousky
and Shabman, 2014). Fourthly, market competition in private
markets is so high that insurers keep the premiums artificially
low to attract more customers; this is for example the case
in the UK (Priest et al., 2016). And fifthly, policyholders or
potential policyholders do not always behave rationally; peo-
ple tend to underestimate risk probability and their need for
insurance (Botzen et al., 2013; Kunreuther, 1996). Their de-
cision to purchase insurance relies on their risk perception,
previous experience, previous provision of governmental loss
compensation, and other factors (Seifert et al., 2013). There
is a large body of literature studying behavioral determinants
of insurance purchase (see, e.g., Botzen and van den Bergh,
2012; Bubeck et al., 2013; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004; Slovic, 1987); however it would
go beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this in detail.
In fact, despite being addressed so often in academic lit-
erature, risk-reflecting premiums for residential flood insur-
ance seem to be more the exception than the rule (see, e.g.,
Table 1 and the country overviews provided by Atreya et
al., 2015, and Den et al., 2017), but this might change in
the future. In Germany, where flood insurance is an op-
tional add-on to building insurance and provided by pri-
vate companies, individual risk pricing on a single prop-
erty level was very uncommon (Thieken et al., 2006); re-
cently, individual agreements to insure single high-risk prop-
erties seem to be becoming more common, and reduced de-
ductibles and premiums are used to reward property-level
protection measures (DKKV, 2015). In the UK, the new
Flood Re scheme hopes to initiate a smooth transition to-
wards risk-based pricing (Surminski and Eldridge, 2015),
although currently, risk decrease due to large-scale struc-
tural measures on the municipal level is not considered in
premium prices (Penning-Rowsell, 2015). Denmark uses a
mixed approach of voluntary–compulsory and public–private
insurance, which enables them to adopt risk-based pricing for
minor flooding events and pool the risk for larger events. Pri-
vate insurers offer a voluntary risk-based insurance for river
and surface flooding after cloudbursts, while losses from
storms and storm floods are financed via a tax which is in-
cluded in the compulsory fire insurance (Den et al., 2017).
The NFIP in the USA calculates full-risk premiums (i.e., un-
subsidized premiums) by considering risk zones as well as
the type of property, and certain property characteristics such
as the number of floors, existence of a basement or elevation,
and several premium adjustment factors in addition (Kousky,
2017). Such a system could lead to risk-reflecting premiums,
but currently the pricing structure is still too coarse, risk re-
flection is disturbed by cross-subsidies, and the risk-zoning
maps were criticized for its inaccuracy; these are all fac-
tors which inhibit reflection of the real risk (Kousky et al.,
2016). However, the NFIP has a mechanism to link property-
level protection measures with premiums: it is a requirement
of the NFIP that new or reconstructed buildings within the
100-year flood zone are elevated above the water depth ex-
pected for a 100-year flood (Aerts and Botzen, 2011; Kousky,
2017; Petrow et al., 2006). And only with an elevation cer-
tificate, which can be issued by state-licensed surveyors, ar-
chitects, or engineers, and has to be paid for by the poli-
cyholder, are policyholders eligible for premium reductions
(Aerts and Botzen, 2011). Similarly the NFIP uses its com-
munity rating system (CRS) to incentivize municipalities to
implement flood risk reduction measures, which then results
in premium reductions for the city inhabitants. But the over-
all success of incentivizing municipalities seems to be low:
by 2014 only 5 % of all NFIP communities participated in
the CRS (Kousky, 2017). The NFIP also makes use of nega-
tive price signals, indicating a potential risk increase in the
future. When municipalities do not fulfill NFIP’s require-
ments for flood management, even after notification, they are
put on probation and can be suspended from the program
in the worst-case scenario; i.e., no flood insurance would be
available for their inhabitants. In the suspension phase, a sur-
charge is added to each new or renewed policy, aiming to
make the policyholders aware of the shortfalls of the mu-
nicipality (NFIP, 2012) or to exert pressure on the munici-
pal government to fulfill the NFIP criteria. A similar mech-
anism to exert pressure on local governments via the citi-
zens is used in France, where deductibles increase consider-
ably in the case of repeated losses and when the municipality
does not develop risk prevention plans. The aim there is that
affected citizens should also lobby the government to im-
plement large-scale structural protection measures, but this
mechanism does not really appear to be successful (Poussin
et al., 2013; Suykens et al., 2016).
When it comes to the difference between premiums
and deductibles, Bräuninger et al. (2011) argue that risk-
reflecting deductibles might be far more effective in promot-
ing risk reduction behavior than premiums, when they are
in a similar order of magnitude as the costs for property-
level protection measures, and thus the rentability of an in-
vestment becomes more obvious to the policyholder. Simi-
larly, Smolka (2006) argues that policyholders have to carry
a substantial portion of the loss to make deductibles an ef-
fective tool to incentivize risk adaptation. He suggests de-
ductibles should be at least 5 % of the insured sum or 10 %
of every loss. Thieken et al. (2006) found that deductibles
for households ranged from EUR 500 to 5000, which would
mean an incentive of EUR 50 and 500 expected losses in
areas with a very high flood probability of 1/10. But mak-
ing properties flood-proof by sealing doors and raising light
wells was reported by Holub and Fuchs (2008) to cost be-
tween EUR 2400 and 8400 (2008 prices). Thus, in this ex-
ample, only for households with a very high flood risk prob-
ability of 1/10 and in the case that the costs of flood-proofing
are low would the high deductible work as a financial incen-
tive to invest in property-level risk reduction. For floods with
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lower probability this would not be the case, even though
the property-level protection measures might still be cost-
effective. A recent study of Den et al. (2017) found that the
use of deductibles is widespread in Europe, but that these
deductibles are relatively small, i.e., not in the range of what
most property-level protection measures would cost, and thus
the incentive given by the deductible must be regarded as lim-
ited. A counterargument for the use of deductibles is that they
are uncertain future costs for policyholders and that they will
not notice the cost-effectiveness of property-level protection
measures in comparison to deductibles before a flood hits
them (Priest et al., 2016), whereas premium reductions are
more tangible benefits; i.e., the policyholder will notice them
each time they pay their premiums.
Indemnification limits, i.e., a capping of the amount of
compensation policyholders can receive, are, beside de-
ductibles, another possibility of sharing the financial bur-
den between insurers and policyholders (Green and Penning-
Rowsell, 2004). Indemnity limits as a percentage of the prop-
erty value insured are practiced in Austria and Italy (Den
et al., 2017), as well as in the USA (Lamond and Penning-
Rowsell, 2014). Loss limits per event or per year are prac-
ticed, e.g., in Belgium, Iceland, and the Netherlands (Priest
et al., 2016). Indemnification limits can be considered to be
even less tangible than deductibles, as they only affect poli-
cyholders when it comes to high flood losses. This is mainly
the case when a low-probability event, i.e., an extremely
strong event, hits, when many property-level protection mea-
sures such as mobile walls would fail to protect the property
anyhow. So, it can be concluded that the use of indemnifica-
tion limits can be considered as not appropriate to serve as
an incentive to promote flood risk adaptation.
When applying risk-adapted prices, especially in high-risk
areas, insurers have to find a balance between risk-reflecting
premiums and acceptability and affordability of insurance
by customers (Smolka, 2006). Unaffordable premiums can
in fact lead to an exclusion of properties from insurance,
which can be intended (see Sect. 4.2.3 on withdrawal) or un-
intended, i.e., when it is, e.g., a low-income area. A solution
to also provide insurance cover for reasonable conditions in
low-income areas with an elevated flood risk is to provide in-
expensive loans or grants for property-level protection mea-
sures, which then in turn also decrease the insurance premi-
ums (see Sect. 4.2.1).
Another issue is the availability of detailed risk informa-
tion, which is a precondition for risk-based flood insurance.
In Europe the EU Floods Directive (EC, 2007) requires flood
hazard and risk maps to be prepared in all countries (Nones,
2017). These maps can form a first basis for partial risk-based
pricing based on risk zones, which is, e.g., applied in Ger-
many for residential flood insurance (Atreya et al., 2015).
For coming to a more detailed flood risk assessment down
to a property level, insurers have to find ways to overcome
the high transaction costs associated with property-level risk
assessment by, for example, shifting these costs to the policy-
holder (see example from Germany described in Sect. 4.1.3).
4.2.2 Special contract conditions and coverage
adjustments
Another steering tool insurers use to trigger flood risk reduc-
tion are special policy conditions in insurance contracts and
coverage adjustments; i.e., certain assets are excluded from
insurance. In Denmark and Iceland, after a flood event, insur-
ance policies can require implementation of property-level
protection measures or coverage will be reduced or insurance
completely refused (Priest et al., 2016). In the Netherlands
restrictions and exceptions for coverage of losses caused
by extreme precipitation exist and are defined in the insur-
ance contracts (Botzen et al., 2010). In Italy insurers exclude
goods on the ground floor below a certain height from cov-
erage (Fiselier and Oosterberg, 2004); restrictions of cover-
age in basements are also practiced in Denmark (Den et al.,
2017). There are unfortunately currently no studies which in-
vestigate in detail how often, in which countries, for which
types of insurance, and under which insurance systems in-
surers make use of the possibility to formulate special policy
conditions and adjust coverage according to risk (Priest et al.,
2016).
4.2.3 Withdrawal of insurance
Withdrawal of insurance from already existing built-up areas
should be considered as a last-resort solution, even though
it might become more likely in the future (Lamond and
Penning-Rowsell, 2014). For large areas, this option is nei-
ther in the interest of the public, who have to cover potential
losses, thus decreasing the financial security of households
(Botzen et al., 2010), nor an adequate solution for insurers
as they must consider this to be foregone business (Smolka,
2006). In history, flood insurance withdrawal has often led
to the creation of national flood loss compensation systems,
such as in the USA (Thomas and Leichenko, 2011) or in
the Netherlands (Suykens et al., 2016). But both examples
showed that complete withdrawal from the market is often
not a permanent solution: in both countries private flood in-
surance is available once again – even though it is difficult
for private insurers to enter the market again.
For smaller areas or single properties at high risk, with-
drawal must be considered as a reasonable solution to avoid
high or repetitive losses. In Australia in 2012 a private insurer
temporary withdrew insurance from two towns which were
flooded three times in 2 years, causing significant losses.
The insurer held a high market share in this region and at
that time there were not many competitors offering flood in-
surance on the market. The 16-month withdrawal resulted in
the construction of levees by the government (McAneney et
al., 2016). The threat of insurance withdrawal is, for exam-
ple, used in the NFIP in the USA, where policyholders in the
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100-year flood zone are only eligible for insurance when they
and their municipality fulfill certain adaptation obligations
(National Flood Insurance Programme, 2012). On the other
hand, will insurance withdrawal from existing high-risk ar-
eas or an announced withdrawal from high-risk areas, which
are regulated in land-use planning for high-value uses (e.g.,
building area or industrial or trade estate), have the long-term
societal benefit that high-risk areas are kept free or used in a
way that no large losses can occur?
4.2.4 Co-investment, grants, and loans
As discussed before, the large upfront investment is consid-
ered a barrier for policyholders, but also for smaller munic-
ipalities to implement flood risk reduction measures. It is
known from the NFIP in the USA that policyholders can
obtain grants to implement property-level protection mea-
sures (Kousky, 2017). In the UK, since 2013/2014, “Repair
and Renew Grants” have been available to policyholders,
which allow extra costs for more flood-resilient repair and
reconstruction after flood damage to be covered (Priest et al.,
2016). Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther (2011) argue that in-
stead of subsidizing the insurance premiums of low-income
households living in poorly constructed houses in the 100-
year flood zone, money should be used to provide them with
grants or low-interest loans to implement property-level pro-
tection measures, or to even relocate their homes to safer ar-
eas. The reduction in insurance premiums could then offset
the annual costs of the loan.
The NFIP also provides financial incentives for states
and local governments to undertake adaptation activities.
Grants are available to support demolition and relocation of
buildings or infrastructure, for structural and nonstructural
retrofitting and elevation of buildings, flood control, and pre-
vention projects, as well as for better planning of flood pre-
vention (Aerts and Botzen, 2011). In France, the Barnier
Fund also provides financing for municipalities to conduct
studies which are necessary to develop required risk preven-
tion plans. In addition, the Barnier Fund allows households to
apply for subsidies to install property-level protection mea-
sures and it provides funds for relocation. According to a sur-
vey among French households, which were affected by flood-
ing, the subsidies were hardly used, whereas funds provided
for relocation were used more often (Poussin et al., 2013).
Co-investment of large-scale structural protection measures
by insurers and the government is common in Switzerland,
and especially in the cantons with public monopoly insur-
ance.
4.2.5 Public–private partnerships (PPPs)
Most existing national flood insurance schemes are based
on PPPs (Paudel, 2012); i.e., public as well as private enti-
ties are involved in flood risk management and risk sharing
(Atreya et al., 2015; Mysiak and Perez-Blanco, 2016). These
arrangements can be very comprehensive, i.e., defining the
whole insurance scheme in a country as, e.g., in the UK, but
also comprising limited actions in time and space as, e.g.,
the flood insurance promotion campaigns run in cooperation
with the federal states in Germany or data sharing agree-
ments between insurers and municipalities in Norway. When
it comes to promoting flood risk reduction, after reviewing
different PPP arrangements, Paudel (2012) recommends that
risk reduction should be integrated in the insurance system,
while Surminski and Hudson (2017) argue that multi-sectoral
partnerships can help to bridge the gap between risk reduc-
tion and insurance and that the instrument insurance should
not be overloaded to fulfill too many different functions.
In the UK, private insurers and the government agreed
that private insurers will provide insurance coverage to all
dwellings which have a minimum standard of flood protec-
tion of 1/75 (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2014). This thresh-
old can be interpreted as an incentive for the government
to establish large-scale structural infrastructure to reduce the
flood risk below 1/75, and thus enable more households to
obtain insurance (Surminski and Eldridge, 2015). It is dis-
puted whether this agreement functions adequately. In the
past insurers were criticized for being the main winners of
an increase in risk reduction by means of large-scale struc-
tural measures, whereas the government, i.e., the taxpayers
who financed these measures, were the main losers (Penning-
Rowsell and Pardoe, 2014). In the USA, the PPP consists in
a governmental flood insurance system, whereby contact to
policyholders is facilitated by private insurance companies.
In Denmark, insurers and the government have several col-
laborative agreements to address flooding from cloudbursts
(Glaas et al., 2016), but they also cooperate in the elaboration
of municipal climate adaptation plans (Den et al., 2017). A
Swiss insurer cooperated with research partners and NGOs
to develop a tool to assess flood risk resilience18. PPPs are
common in many countries, when it comes to the elaboration
of improved flood risk maps based on data shared between
insurers and the government (see Sect. 4.1.1 for examples).
5 Discussion
Most common across all insurance schemes and countries
is the use of information campaigns to raise awareness of
flood risk and flood risk reduction among a broader popu-
lation. These communication measures can be judged to be
relatively inexpensive and easy to perform as most insurers
already have the required communication channels in place.
They are independent of framing conditions and will become
more cost-effective the more people that can be reached. A
clear downside of communication measures is the difficulty
in quantifying their effectiveness, e.g., in the form of re-
duced losses. Often a detailed evaluation is completely miss-
18https://www.zurich.com/en/corporate-responsibility/
flood-resilience, last access: 12 September 2018
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Table 2. Overview of insurance engagement in flood risk reduction measures and their use of incentives, contrasted with the framing condi-
tions.
Type of flood risk reduction
measure
Examples of countries
where insurers are di-
rectly engaged in flood
risk reduction or use in-
centives to promote it
Use of incentives to foster the uptake of flood risk re-
duction measure by third parties
Influence of framing conditions on insurance engage-
ment in flood risk reduction measures
Risk knowledge (provision)
– targeting citizens
USA, Germany,
Switzerland, Norway
Often done in PPPs, co-financing Relatively inexpensive, so engagement makes sense un-
der all types of insurance schemes.
Risk knowledge (sharing) –
with governments
Germany, Norway,
Denmark, Switzerland,
USA, UK, France
Often done in PPPs, co-financing Knowledge that is easier to share in countries with pub-
lic insurance schemes, as claim data have a competitive
value in private insurance schemes.
Prevention –
Land-use planning
USA, Switzerland Withdrawal or, better, the threat of withdrawal is used to
enforce better land-use planning, e.g., in Switzerland.
No insurance engagement in regional or local land-use
planning in private insurance schemes, but in public
systems with high market penetration.
Prevention –
Building codes
USA, Switzerland USA: contractual requirement in high-risk zones Less insurance engagement in private than in public in-
surance schemes. In countries with private insurance
schemes, insurers seem to only be engaged on a higher
level, while in some public systems, insurers are also
engaged in the enforcement of building codes.
Adaptation – property-level
measures
Germany, USA,
Denmark, Iceland
Germany, UK, Denmark, USA: adjustment of premi-
ums and deductibles;
Denmark, Iceland, Germany: formulation of special
contract conditions, coverage restrictions
USA, France: offering of grants, loans, subsidies
Requires detailed knowledge of the risk to enable risk-
based pricing. Often insurance scheme principles such
as affordability or solidarity make the application dif-
ficult. Can generate high transaction costs when rolled
out to the whole market, so smart solutions are required
to evade these costs.
Protection – large-scale
structural flood infrastruc-
ture
Switzerland, UK, USA Switzerland: direct investment
USA: positive and negative premium adjustments for
citizens, when the municipality complies with NFIP
regulations and, e.g., implements infrastructure
UK: PPPs, the agreements between the government and
the insurers, contain the requirement for the government
to lower the flood risk to 1/75
Australia: insurance withdrawal from a high-risk area
leads to the construction of structural infrastructure by
the government
Most insurers currently do not see it as their role to
invest in large-scale structural flood infrastructure. In
some countries mechanisms exist to stimulate the im-
plementation of large-scale flood protection infrastruc-
ture by governmental actors via the existing insurance
scheme.
Preparedness – monitoring
and early warning
Switzerland Investment to develop early warning applications. Is considered to be a governmental task, but could be
included in risk knowledge provision campaigns for cit-
izens.
Preparedness – emergency
measures
Switzerland Co-financing Is usually considered to be a governmental task.
ing (Kousky, 2017). In addition, continuous campaigns are
needed in order not to revert to the previous status (Den et
al., 2017). And even though some campaigns were success-
ful in raising insurance penetration rates as, e.g., in Germany,
they did not show an effect on flood risk prevention behavior
of policyholders (Osberghaus and Philippi, 2016).
Quite common, although not formalized in most countries,
is the exchange or sharing of historic flood risk and loss data
between public authorities and insurers with the aim to im-
prove flood risk and hazard maps. While in public insurance
schemes the information flow in both directions can be con-
sidered to be relatively unproblematic, insurers in private in-
surance schemes might be more restrictive in sharing historic
claim data as these data form part of their business. In this
context, trust between insurers and governmental agencies
was found to be an important success factor for sharing data
(Den et al., 2017).
Two interesting new approaches were found in Germany
and the UK, where the dissemination of information about
how to reduce flood risk at a property level to policyholders is
combined with the collection of data on a property level. The
gained data could enable insurers to better assess the single-
property flood risk in the future. The German approach in
addition shifts the transaction costs entangled with property-
level assessments to the policyholders.
Information campaigns can also be tied to warning ser-
vices as, e.g., done in Switzerland. This especially makes
sense for minor flooding events with lower return periods,
such as heavy rainfall events. The costs of developing warn-
ing applications like mobile phone apps can be considered
to be low, when it is possible to make use of existing gov-
ernmental prediction systems. Besides raising awareness, en-
gagement in warning activities might also have positive ef-
fects for the insurer–policyholder relationship. A main hin-
drance in this case might also be that early warnings and
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emergency responses are considered to be governmental
tasks in most countries.
Limited observations of insurance engagement in preven-
tive activities related to land-use planning and building codes
might be due to the fact that these activities are first of
all considered to be governmental tasks in most countries.
Land-use planning, in addition, mostly occurs at the local to
regional level. The transaction costs, i.e., the time and re-
sources it would require for private insurance companies to
familiarize themselves with local conditions, might be too
high in comparison to the gains which could be expected
by potential loss reductions. In public insurance schemes,
in which insurers operate on a cost recovery basis, are not
thought to make profits, and where the avoidance of over-
all societal losses is more in the focus of the insurers, en-
gagement in prevention activities will probably be perceived
as a useful action to reduce flood losses as the examples
from the USA and Switzerland show. Under private insur-
ance schemes it makes more sense that insurance umbrella
organizations on behalf of their members follow general de-
velopments in land-use planning and get engaged in the de-
velopment of building codes to ensure, e.g., that the overall
loss potential does not increase.
Denial of insurance coverage in high-risk areas should be
considered as a last-resort instrument to influence land-use
planning, even though it can be considered a very effective
one. In private markets, the denial of coverage by one com-
pany always bears the risk of losing customers to another
company. In public insurance schemes, it will depend on the
degree of governmental involvement in insurance and proba-
bly also the legal regulations if insurers were allowed to take
such a drastic step. Considering the long-term overall soci-
etal benefit, it would be better to reduce the accumulation of
assets and values in high-risk areas; withdrawal of insurance
from certain areas might accelerate this process.
Largely, the main hindrance for increased insurer engage-
ment in large-scale structural measures is probably that in-
surers currently do not see it as their role to directly pro-
vide or invest in risk reduction infrastructure (Surminski et
al., 2015; Swiss Re, 2013). From a purely economic point
of view, investments in large-scale structural measures are
rentable when the amount of avoided losses exceeds the in-
vestment. A precondition for making such kinds of invest-
ment profitable for insurance companies is that the policy-
holders protected by the built infrastructure stay with the
same insurer over a long period, i.e., at least until the invest-
ment is paid off, and that a large number of policyholders are
protected by the same infrastructure. These preconditions are
only fulfilled today in countries with public monopoly insur-
ers and/or where insurance is compulsory, such as Switzer-
land, Spain, or France, or quasi-compulsory, as in Ireland and
Sweden (Maccaferri et al., 2012).
High transaction costs involved in risk assessment and
consideration of adaptation measures at a property level are
probably a hinderance for insurers to more proactively incen-
tivize property-level protection measures. A solution to over-
come this problem is to shift these costs to the policyholder,
by requiring them to pay for experts to assess the flood risk at
their property and attest the implementation of property-level
protection measures. For insurers with a mutual insurance
structure, the increased transaction costs might be of less
importance in the case that the promotion of property-level
adaptation is considered beneficial for the insurance commu-
nity.
In private insurance schemes, insurance companies may
consider it a disadvantage in the market to require the im-
plementation of property-level protection from their policy-
holders, when implementation is not required by their mar-
ket competitors. This barrier does not exist in public insur-
ance schemes without market competition and might be less
pronounced for mutual insurance. In addition property-level
protection measures are meant to reduce minor losses from
high-frequency events, while insurance should cover large
losses from low-probability events (see Fig. 1); thus most
insurers would probably only be interested in incentivizing
those types of property-level measures which are also able to
reduce larger losses occurring at more seldom events, such
as the safeguarding of tanks to avoid contamination with oil
or other hazardous substances, which has been shown to in-
crease losses substantially (Kreibich et al., 2005). A good
chance to implement property-level protection measures is
after severe damage, when reconstruction is required. Here
insurance companies could easily not only allow for, but en-
courage their policyholders to undertake, flood-adapted re-
construction.
Adaptation by property-level measures is also closely
linked to insurance incentives, which can be used to promote
them. Even though modeling studies found the use of risk-
based premiums to be effective in fostering property-level
adaptation measures (Hudson et al., 2016), in practice risk-
based pricing is currently more the exception than the rule.
First it would require very detailed risk data and informa-
tion about the effectiveness of different property-level pro-
tection measures, which are not yet available everywhere.
Secondly, it would require the flood risk and flood risk in-
surance products to be disentangled from other risks (i.e.,
other hazards) and products (i.e., sold together with prop-
erty or fire insurance) it is bundled with and single-risk prod-
ucts to be developed. Currently not all countries already pro-
vide single-hazard flood risk insurance products (see, e.g.,
Table 1). And thirdly, all other “premium corrections”, like
cross-subsidizing premium earnings in high-risk areas with
premium earnings from low-risk areas (as practiced e.g., in
the USA), need to be removed. This would mean at the same
time that the advantages of bundling or cross-subsidizing
such as spreading of risk and increasing affordability are lost.
An alternative, which would probably require less restruc-
turing of insurance products, would be to only give “price
signals” to policyholders without calculating risk-reflecting
prices i.e., by lowering the premium or deductibles by a cer-
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tain amount in the case that property-level protection mea-
sures are applied.
In the USA and France, insurers try to use price signals
to policyholders in parallel to incentivize local governments,
i.e., municipalities, to improve their flood risk management.
The idea of engaging municipalities is good in principle as
municipalities are often responsible for land-use planning,
implementation of large-scale protective infrastructure, and
emergency response. They have a considerable potential to
reduce the local risk of flooding. In both countries, the mech-
anism works with positive, but also negative, incentives; i.e.,
policyholders in the relevant municipality are “punished”
with higher premiums or deductibles in the case that the mu-
nicipality does not follow up the requirements of the insurer.
As a second step, the mechanism implies that the policyhold-
ers, in their role of inhabitants of a municipality, complain
against the municipal flood risk management. As one single
complaint would probably not be enough to get things going
at a municipal level, it would further require that several pol-
icyholders join forces. In the opinion of the author there are
too many factors that must come together for the mechanism
to work as designed. There are some first indications from
France that the mechanism it is not working optimally there
(Poussin et al., 2013; Suykens et al., 2016). A detailed eval-
uation for both France and the USA would be of great value
for the future of these programs.
An underestimated instrument to incentivize property-
level adaptation is the formulation of special contract con-
ditions. Depending on their market share, insurers are in the
unique position of having personalized contact to many prop-
erty owners, which might positively influence the property
owners’ risk reduction behavior. However, from an insurer’s
perspective are individual contract arrangements and on-site
risk assessments are more rentable for high-value objects
such as large businesses than for households or small busi-
nesses’ insurance, which can be considered as mass markets.
In private markets with strong competition, insurance com-
panies might, in addition, consider obligatory contractual re-
quirements for property-level protection measures as a hin-
derance to increase or hold their market share, as this would
require additional efforts from their policyholders. Thus it
will be easier to use this instrument in public insurance
schemes where competition is lacking (Lamond et al., 2009).
For this kind of incentive, it will probably be beneficial again
to use the window of opportunity after a flooding event to in-
troduce special contract conditions requiring property-level
protection measures. It would definitely be beneficial in so-
ciety as a whole to include “build back better” requirements
as a standard element in insurance contracts (Den et al., 2017;
Priest et al., 2016).
Another instrument, which requires reconsideration, in the
author’s opinion, is deductibles. In Europe, they are currently
too small to incentivize the implementation of property-level
protection measures considering the price of these measures.
But as mentioned before, as an incentive it might also work to
just lower the deductible as a reward for the implementation
of property-level protection measures.
Financial aid for both property-level protection measures
and for large-scale protection infrastructure in the form of
subsidies and grants was found in public as well as in pri-
vate insurance schemes. But direct co-investment of insur-
ers in large-scale protection infrastructure only happened in
Switzerland. However, for most programs, an evaluation of
their success, i.e., the uptake rates or total sums of financial
aid used, is missing.
In most insurance schemes, public as well as private, there
are already different types of cooperation, i.e., PPPs, between
public and private actors, and the public–private relation-
ship spans from “parasitic” to “symbiotic” relations (Green
and Penning-Rowsell, 2004). Public insurance in the USA,
France, or Spain makes use of the private insurance compa-
nies to maintain all forms of customer–insurance relation-
ship. These relationships involving multiple actors are ex-
pected to evolve in the future (Surminski and Hudson, 2017)
and might also take a role in the promotion of flood risk
reduction. National and even local contexts determine if in-
surance activities are perceived as complimentary or rival to
public activities. In a public insurance system in which the
insurers are closely tied to the government, insurance en-
gagement in land-use planning, warning, or investment in
large-scale protective infrastructure will be perceived as nor-
mal, whereas this probably will not be the case in private
insurance schemes. On the other hand, this might only be a
question of time as new forms of financing including private
investments are already emerging – especially in the area of
climate change mitigation – and some of them might also be
relevant for flood risk reduction (see, e.g., Banhalmi-Zakar
et al., 2016).
6 Conclusions
Even though the anchorage of risk reduction is lacking in
most insurance schemes (Surminski and Hudson, 2017), this
study has revealed that several insurers in developed coun-
tries are either directly engaged or use incentives to promote
flood risk reduction measures (see Table 2 for an overview).
These findings indicate that much information about insur-
ance engagement in flood risk reduction is in grey literature
or on web pages in national languages. Thus, there are prob-
ably more activities than those reported in this article.
This study advances the existing body of literature by as-
sessing all types of flood risk reduction mechanisms. Direct
insurance activities are determined as well as the application
of incentives to foster the uptake of flood risk reduction mea-
sures by third parties. I also identify which framing condi-
tions of insurance activities would be most appropriate. The
findings of this study are relevant for policymakers when re-
designing national insurance systems, for insurers to be in-
spired by other insurers’ activities in the field of risk reduc-
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tion, and for other actors who envisage a cooperation with
insurers in risk reduction activities.
Surprisingly, risk-based pricing is seldom practiced, even
though it is heavily argued for in academic literature. As dis-
cussed previously, the key barriers are the lack of detailed
information on the single property risk and on the effective-
ness of property-level protection measures. The bundling of
flood risk insurance products with other products or risks
can be considered another critical barrier. In addition, high
transaction costs may prevent more insurance engagement
in flood risk reduction. As the knowledge base for detailed
flood risk mapping and the effects of property-level protec-
tion measures improve or advance in the future, insurers will
be able to take them into account in their risk calculations.
However, it remains unclear if they would also move to more
detailed risk-based pricing and if other mechanisms will be
developed to satisfy criteria like the affordability and avail-
ability of flood risk insurance. In this context it will be inter-
esting to determine how new solutions, like the outsourcing
of high risks in separate insurance schemes, are performing,
as done in the UK and Denmark.
There is an indication that the degree of insurance engage-
ment depends on the framing conditions of the national in-
surance scheme. Insurers in public insurance schemes seem
to be more proactive when it comes to flood risk reduction.
This is probably due to the fact that the schemes are often
interwoven with the government and face less or no mar-
ket competition. They are also not required to increase their
shareholder value. New developments can also be expected
in this field: PPPs are already very common in all insurance
schemes and it is beyond all doubt that flood risk reduc-
tion requires the collaboration of multiple actors from differ-
ent sectors (Kron, 2015; Surminski and Hudson, 2017). The
roles and responsibilities PPPs or multi-sector partnerships
could take in different countries in the future will depend on
the cultural contexts, historic flood risk management arrange-
ments, and the societal roles negotiated for the different ac-
tors. There could be a stronger cooperation between banks,
insurers, and the government to develop new financing solu-
tions. This could include insurance products with a property-
level risk reduction component, while taking into account
the affordability of those products for all population groups.
A cooperation between the building industry and insurers is
also possible. Building companies could then already include
property-level protection measures in larger building projects
and offer flood insurance at good terms as a selling point. In
the same direction, the findings suggest the creation of more
meeting arenas for insurers, regulators, politicians, and other
governmental actors to learn from each other, build trust, and
discuss new solutions.
Further detailed investigations are required for assessing
the effectiveness of insurers’ attempts to incentivize govern-
mental actions by changing the insurance conditions for citi-
zens, like in the USA or France. In the UK an exclusion from
property insurance in high-risk areas did not lead to an avoid-
ance of developments. In this case, is it ethically justifiable
to penalize third parties (i.e., the policyholders/inhabitants of
a municipality) for the shortfall of someone else (i.e., munic-
ipal or public administration)? A suggested solution to over-
come this is that decision makers, such as land-use planners
and building companies working in floodplains, should retain
a share of responsibility and liability for the flood risk (Green
and Penning-Rowsell, 2004; Surminski and Thieken, 2017).
There is a lack of thorough evaluation of insurance activi-
ties in order to determine whether the activities have reached
their envisaged effect. This holds true for insurance activities
that directly target flood risk reduction measures. Evaluation
studies would help cross-country or cross-insurance system
learning and enable insurers to better target their flood risk
reduction activities in an effective manner in the future. In
this context, a detailed study of the complete Swiss insur-
ance system would be of special interest. Since the Swiss
monopoly insurers are very proactive when it comes to their
engagement in flood risk reduction, it would be of great inter-
est to see if there are “spill-over” effects to the private system
existing in other cantons. In addition, real-life case studies
are needed in order to determine the effectiveness of risk-
based pricing as tools to incentivize flood risk adaptation at
the policyholder level.
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